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Judges in the Executive Branch and Judges in the
Judicial Branch: Similar, Yet Distinct
Thomas G. Welshko*
I. Introduction.
Administrative adjudication exists as a necessary alternative to
formal adjudication in the constitutional courts. The array of cases
handled by administrative law judges, hearing officers and other
executive branch adjudicators would crush an already overwhelmed
judiciary. However, the need for administrative adjudication to play a
greater role in the administration of justice has obscured some of the
differences between executive branch judges and their counterparts in
the constitutional courts. For example, administrative adjudicators can
determine the constitutionality of statutes, a function usually reserved
for the courts. I Administrative adjudicators, like constitutional judges,
make credibility findings that must be given deference upon review.2
Discovery and motions practice, common in the courts, are expanding
in the administrative setting.'
Yet, as the similarities between executive branch judges and
constitutional judges continue to grow, important differences remain.
Executive branch judges, unlike judges in the judiciary, impose
sanctions that are remedial, not punitive.' The rules of evidence used
in administrative hearings are more relaxed than those used in the
*Maryland Administrative Law Judge.
'Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 664 A.2d 862
(Md. 1995).
2 3-E Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 26 F.3rd 1 (1st Cir. 1994);
Anderson v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 623 A.2d 198 (Md.
1993).
3See, for example, the Rules of Procedure of the Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, found at Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 28.02.01.10
and 28.02.01.16.
4Maryland v. Jones, 666 A.2d 128 (Md. 1995) interpreting Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989).
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federal and state courts--most prominently, the hearsay rule.5
Administrative adjudicators, unlike judges in the judiciary, also hear
cases using diverse methods and in varied settings. A full, trial-type
hearing is not always necessary.6  These distinctions make
administrative law judges and hearing officials of all kinds particularly
well-suited to provide administrative justice that is both fair and
efficient.
II. Similarities.
A. Ability of Executive Branch Adjudicators to Decide
Constitutional Issues.
In the past, administrative adjudicators could not decide
constitutional issues. The philosophy that prevailed until recently
dictated that executive branch hearing officials had to apply the law,
even if they believed that a particular statutory provision violated the
constitution.7 Yet, in recent years, the United States Supreme Court
and other appellate courts have carved out exceptions to this general
rule. The implications of this change are significant.
In Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,8 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) could decide constitutional issues. The
court ruled that it did and stated the following, in pertinent part:
As for petitioner's constitutional claim, we agree that
"[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional
enactments has generally been thought beyond the
jurisdiction of administrative agencies," Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. at 398, 94 S.Ct. at 1166, quoting
5Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 298 A.2d 148 (Md. 1973);
Kade v. Charles H. Hickey, Jr. School, 80 Md. App. 721, 566 A.2d 148 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1989).6Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
7Buckeye Industries v. Secretary of Labor, 587 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979); Tung
Chi Jen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California, 566 F.2d 1095
(9th Cir. 1977))
8510 U.S.200 (1994)
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Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242,
89 S.Ct. 414, 419, 21 L.Ed. 2d 402 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result); accord, Califano v,. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99, 109, 97 S.Ct. 980, 986, 51 L.Ed. 192 (1977).
This rule is not mandatory, however, and is perhaps of
less consequence where, as here, the reviewing body is
not the agency itself, but an independent commission
established exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes.
See Secretary v. Richardson, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 8, 18 - 20
(1981). 9
The emphasis the court placed on the ability of "independent
commissions" to decide constitutional issues cannot be underestimated,
particularly with respect to state administrative adjudication. As more
states adopt central panel hearing offices, those offices become farther
removed from the agencies whose cases they hear. They are not merely
arms of the executive branch in enforcing the law, but also have an
interpretative function as well. In this regard, state central panels
function more like courts. Consequently, under the doctrine established
in Thunder Basin, they should have the greater discretion in deciding
constitutional issues.
A year after the Supreme Court's decision in Thunder Basin, the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Insurance Commissioner of the State of
Maryland v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States 0
also ruled that administrative adjudicators have the discretion to decide
constitutional issues. In that case, the Maryland Human Relations
Commission and the National Organization for Women (N.O.W.)
sought judicial review of the Maryland Insurance Commissioner's"
91d. at 215
10664 A.2d 862 (Md.1995).
"Normally, the Insurance Commissioner would not have heard this case
personally. COMAR 09.31.19.01B [24:6 Md. Reg. 793 (May 23, 1997)], formerly
09.30.65.05, provides for the delegation of his authority to adjudicatory hearings to
Maryland's Office of Administrative Hearings. However, COMAR 09.31.19.04 [24:6 Md.
Reg. 793 (May 23, 1997)], formerly 09.30.65.06, allows the Commissioner to revoke this
general delegation of authority to the Office of Administrative Hearings on a case-by-case
basis when "novel or unanticipated factual issues" or "significant social, fiscal or legal
issues" are involved. Consequently, the Commissioner was acting as an administrative
adjudicator in this instance.
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determination that state statutes authorizing rate differentials based on
gender for life, disability income and similar kinds of insurance
discriminated on the basis of sex and, therefore, violated Article 46 of
the Declaration of Rights in the Maryland Constitution. The insurer,
Equitable, argued that the Commissioner lacked authority to decide the
constitutionality of the statutory sections at issue. It contended that
only the courts could make constitutional determinations. The
Commissioner disagreed. In his opinion, he noted that Md. Ann. Code
art. 48A, § 25(4)(a) (1994) required him to consider "'all laws of the
State' relative to the issues before him." Additionally, he explained that
he was not making a declaration of rights, but merely applying pertinent
law. He also stated that judicial review still existed as an adequate
safeguard if his constitutional determinations were erroneous. 2
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which heard Equitable's
initial appeal, rejected the Insurance Commissioner's view that he could
rule on the constitutionality of statutes, but the Maryland Court of
Appeals reinstated the Commissioner's original holding. 3 That court
noted that an administrative agency had the authority to declare a statute
unconstitutional as well as decide whether a statute as applied in a
particular circumstance ran afoul of the state or federal constitution.'4
The court wrote, in pertinent part:
Nevertheless, the lack of authority to issue a declaratory
judgment or ruling on the constitutionality of a statute
does not mean that an administrative agency or official,
in the course of rendering a decision in a matter falling
within the agency's jurisdiction, must ignore applicable
law simply because the source of the law is the state or
federal constitution. The Insurance Code, Art. 48A, §
25(4)(a), in giving the Insurance Commissioner
"jurisdiction to enforce by administrative action the
laws of the State as they relate to the underwriting or
rate setting practices of an insurer," has no exclusion
12 664 A.2d 868-69.
13Id. at 870, 875.
14Id. at 875.
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for constitutional law. The Administrative Procedure
Act's requirement that state administrative agencies
must render conclusions of law in contested cases
contains no exceptions for constitutional issues. See §§
10-205(b)(2), 10-220, and 10-221(b) of the [Maryland]
State Government Article. In fact, under both the
Insurance Code and the Administrative Procedure Act,
a constitutional error in an administrative decision, as
well as "other error of law," is included among the
grounds for judicial review of administrative decisions.
Article 48A, § 40(4); § 10-222(h) of the State
Government Article.'5
The court went on to say:
Finally, where a constitutional challenge to a statute,
regardless of its nature, is intertwined with the need to
consider evidence and render findings of fact, and where
the legislature has created an administrative proceeding
for such purpose, this Court has regularly taken the
position that the matter should be initially resolved in
the administrative proceeding. See, e.g., Gingell v.
County Commissioners, supra, 249 Md. At 376-377,
239 A.2d at 904 - 905; Poe v. Baltimore City, supra,
241 Md. At 307, 311,216 A.2d at 709, 711; Pressman
v. State Tax Commission, supra, 204 Md. At 84, 102
A.2d at 824. In the present case, the particular
constitutional attack on portions of the Insurance Code
required an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact.
First, the need to resolve the constitutional issue was
dependent upon, inter alia, evidence and findings with
regard to actuarial justification. Second, we have held
that, under the E.R.A., statutory classifications based on
gender are generally subject to strict scrutiny, with those
defending the classifications having the burden of
"Id. at 872.
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justifying them. State v. Burning Tree County Club,
Inc., supra, 315 Md. At 295, 554 A.2d at 386.
Equitable undertook to justify its gender based
insurance rates on the ground that they reflected
inherent physical differences between men and women.
This issue obviously required an extensive evidentiary
exploration which the General Assembly determined
should be done by the Insurance Commissioner.
Consequently, the circuit court erred in holding that the
Insurance Commissioner lacks authority to decide
whether portions of the Insurance Code are
unconstitutional.16
Maryland's Court of Appeals concluded that administrative
agencies are empowered--indeed, obligated--to decide constitutional -
issues in administrative proceedings, and can also declare an entire
statute unconstitutional. This function is no longer solely reserved for
the courts.
I was faced with deciding a constitutional issue in a case I heard
for the Maryland Department of the Environment. In Erb v. Maryland
Dept. of Environment, a property owner raised objections to a
statutory/regulatory scheme which allegedly allowed the taking of his
private property without just compensation in violation of 5th and 14th
Amendments to the United States Constitution, citing Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.'7 I ruled that the Lucas case was
inapplicable to the Appellant's case because the Maryland Department
of the Environment was simply exercising its traditional police powers
and that this exercise did not violate the 5th and 14th Amendments.
The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld my ruling and adopted my
reasoning in deciding Erb on appeal.'" My authority to address
constitutional issues was not called into question.
B. Deference Must be Given to the Decisions of
1
6Id. at 876.
"7505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
"676 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
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Administrative Adjudicators.
The courts and other reviewing bodies must give "due
deference" to the findings of fact made by administrative adjudicators.
Reviewers of administrative decisions cannot pick and choose what
facts they will accept or reject. When reviewed, administrative
adjudicators' decisions are, therefore, becoming less subject to attack,
like those of the constitutional courts.
In Maryland, proposed findings of fact by Hearing Officers
(before the advent of the Office of Administrative Hearings) and by
Administrative Law Judges (after the creation of the Office of
Administrative Hearings) were subject to change by the Secretary of
Personnel's designee. It was the Secretary's designee's practice to
review transcripts or tape recordings and second-guess an
administrative law judge's credibility determinations. One of my
decisions was overturned in this way. That case 9 involved a prison
correctional officer whom management accused of failing to lock a cell
door according to required practice. The respondent correctional officer
testified that she had locked the door, but a mechanical failure had
caused it to open by itself. Several other correctional officers testified
that similar mechanical malfunctions had caused other locks to fail in
this way, resulting in several cell doors coming open by themselves.
Nevertheless, management's witness, the institutional maintenance
supervisor, testified that the locks were working properly. I found the
respondent correctional officer and her witnesses credible and
overturned her disciplinary suspension in my proposed decision.
However, on appeal, the Designee of the Secretary of Personnel
reviewed the tape recording of the hearing and reinstated the original
suspension. She did so, stating that I made incorrect credibility
determinations.
The ability of a reviewing body to change an administrative law
judge's decision, particularly based on credibility findings, was
severely restricted in Anderson v. Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services.2" Citing Universal Camera Corp. v. National
Labor Rel. Bd.,2 the Anderson decision made it clear that an agency
'gSabb v. Division of Correction, OAH NO. 91-DOP-MRDCC-02-2373 (1991).
20623 A.2d 198 (Md. 1993).
21340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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can only reverse a decision of a lower level adjudicator when his or her
findings are clearly erroneous and that "the agency should give
appropriate deference to the opportunity of the examiner to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses."'22 Cases like Anderson23 illustrate that the
decisions of administrative law judges and those of other executive
branch adjudicators cannot be reversed simply because a reviewing
body believes the result should have been different.
C. Discovery and Motions' Practice.
The acceptance of the use of discovery and more formalized
motions practice in central panel hearing agency states also illustrates
the growing similarity between administrative adjudicators and judges
in the judiciary. Prior to the creation of the Office of Administrative
Hearings in Maryland, discovery and a substantial motions practice for
administrative proceedings were almost unknown. Only certain
agencies, such as the Maryland Commission on Human Relations, had
provisions for pre-hearing discovery and expansive motions practice.24
Now, Maryland has limited discovery under COMAR 28.02.01.10 and
a provision for motions practice under COMAR 28.02.01.16.
Documents must be made available by a party for inspection and
copying.2 Motions in limine, for summary decision, for dismissal and
for sequestration of witnesses are common under the state's central
panel structure.
Maryland is not alone in allowing expanded discovery. Many
central panel states' discovery provisions are even more extensive than
Maryland's. 26 In Florida,27 Minnesota,28 New Jersey 29 North
221d., 623 A.2d at 212.23Recent federal cases also support the principle cited in Anderson. See 3-E
Company, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 26 F.3rd 1 (1st. Cir. 1994).24Formerly COMAR 14.03.10.07G, K and J(2).25COMAR 28.02.01.10A.
26Maryland's discovery provisions are actually among the most restrictive as
compared with other central panel states.27Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R. 60Q-2.019 (1995).
28Minn. Rule, 1400.6700 (2.) (1995).2 9N.J. Admin. Code Tit. 1, §§ 1:1-10.1 - 1:1-10.6. (Supp. 1996).
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Carolina,3" Tennessee 3' and several other states, administrative
discovery parallels that of the state courts of general jurisdiction.32 In
fact, these states' administrative procedure acts or rules of procedure
often do not set out specific discovery rules, but cross reference each
respective states' rules of civil procedure. Some states, like Minnesota,
do clarify their administrative rules of procedure by allowing parties to
demand that opposing parties provide the names and addresses of all
witnesses who will be testifying at the hearing. 33 Parties can also seek
"any relevant written or recorded-statement made by the party or by
witnesses on behalf of a party."'  If a party refuses to provide the
information sought by the opposing party, a motion to compel discovery
can be made to the presiding administrative law judge.35 If the
administrative law judge grants the moving party's motion, the
opposing party must produce the requested material or face sanctions,
such as being unable to present evidence concerning the subject matter
of the information sought during discovery.36
Similarly, the use of motions, other than motions to dismiss,
was rare in the administrative setting. It is now common. The
Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings now permits the use of the
motion for summary decision.37 As in a court proceeding, a party in an
administrative hearing can move for "summary judgment" if the
material facts in the case are not in dispute and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This differs considerably from
the practice of the individual agencies before the advent of the Office
of Administrative Hearings. Typically, all parties had to agree to
dismiss a case before the hearing examiner could dismiss a case or
grant a "summary decision."38
'N.C. Admin. Code § 26.03.0112 (Jan. 1994).
3 Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. Tit. 4-5, ch. 313 (1991).
32 This is in conformance with § 4-210 of the Uniform Law Commissioners'
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981, 1996-97 Revised Edition).33Minn. Rule 1400.6700, (1)(A) (1995).34Minn. Rule 1400.6700 (1)(B) (1995).35Id.
36Minn. Rules, Part 1400.6700(3) (1995).
37See COMAR 28.02.01.16C.
3To a limited extent, individual agencies in Maryland have still retained this rule.
The Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation will still not permit dismissal
of a case without the concurrence of all parties. See COMAR 09.01.03.04.
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Other central panel states also allow for motions' practice.
Again, Florida,39 Minnesota,4' New Jersey, 41 North Carolina 42 and
Tennessee43 allow for motions' practice and the scheduling of in-person
or telephonic pre-hearing conferences to address each party's arguments
with regard to the merits of the motion.'
Ill. Differences.
Because of the growing similarities between judicial and
administrative adjudicatory functions, one might conclude that
administrative adjudication serves no purpose. It is simply mimicking
the court system and, therefore, could be abolished. This is not true.
There are still many differences between adjudication in the
administrative setting and adjudication in court, differences which
illustrate why administrative adjudication is an important adjunct to
adjudication by the courts. These differences make administrative
adjudication practical and indispensable.
A. Administrative Adjudicators Impose Remedial Sanctions.
One of the most prominent differences between administrative
and court adjudication is that administrative adjudicators impose
sanctions that are essentially corrective or remedial in nature, rather
than punitive. The case of Maryland v. Jones " illustrates the
important, but different function, served by administrative adjudication.
The defendant in Jones relied on the United States Supreme
Court's holdings in United States v. Halper4 6 and Department of
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch47 in an attempt to persuade the
Maryland Court of Appeals to uphold the trial court's nullification of
39Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R. 60Q-2.019 (1995).
'Minn. Rule1400.6700(2) (1995).41N.J. Admin. Code Tit. 1, §§ 1:1-12.1 - 1:1-12.7. (Supp. 1996)42N.C. Admin. Code § 26.03.0115 (Jan. 1994).
4 Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. Tit. 4-5, ch. 308 (1991).
"See § 4-207 of the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model State Administrative
Procedure Act (1981, 1996-97 Revised Edition).
4"666 A.2d 128 (Md. 1995).
46490 U.S. 435 (1989).
47511 U.S. 767 (1994).
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his conviction for driving while intoxicated. Both Halper and Kurth
Ranch held that the imposition of civil penalties in conjunction with
criminal penalties arising from the same set of circumstances can
constitute double jeopardy where the civil penalties are punitive and
serve no remedial purpose.
The Jones case held that the imposition of a driver's license
suspension under the administrative per se law, Md. Code Ann.,
Transp. II § 16-205.1 (1992 & Supp. 1997), for drivers who have a
breath alcohol test result of 0.10% or more is a remedial penalty, not a
punitive sanction.48 Therefore, suspending the license of a defendant-
driver for a 0.10% or greater alcohol test result at an administrative
hearing, then subsequently trying him for driving while intoxicated in
criminal court, does not constitute double jeopardy under the 6th and
14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.49
Had Maryland's Court of Appeals accepted the defendant's
double jeopardy argument in Jones, the very idea of a central panel
administrative hearing agency in Maryland would no longer be viable.
The Motor Vehicle Administration would have had to forgo suspending
licenses for breath alcohol concentrations of 0.10% or more. Other
agencies, such as the Maryland Insurance Administration, Home
Improvement Commission, Real Estate Commission and Department
of the Environment would have been similarly affected.- The state
would either have had to choose between seeking administrative
sanctions (civil fines, license or permit revocations) or criminal
penalties, or more likely, the entire process would have had to be given
to the courts so all of these actions could be adjudicated simultaneously.
This would have had the effect of clogging court dockets further and,
consequently, delaying the imposition of license suspensions and other
civil penalties to the detriment of the public good.
The Maryland's Court of Appeals' decision in Jones conforms
with those of other state appellate courts that have addressed the double
jeopardy issue with regard to alcohol-related driving offenses. The
"8666 A.2d at 142.
49Id. at 141 - 143.
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appellate courts of Alaska,5 ° Colorado,5 and Florida52 have determined
that double jeopardy does not preclude the imposition of criminal
penalties for driving while intoxicated or driving while under the
influence of alcohol, if a driver has been suspended for an alcohol test
result violation arising from the same incident.
Appellate courts have also found Halper and Kurth Ranch
inapplicable to inmate disciplinary cases. United States v. Newby 3 held
that prosecuting inmates criminally for the same misconduct that was
the subject of institutional disciplinary proceedings did not constitute
double jeopardy under Halper. As in Jones, the United State Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, ruled that the civil penalty, specifically,
the loss of inmate good conduct time, was not "so divorced from any
remedial goal" that it could be considered a second punishment under
the 6th Amendment.54
B. Evidence.
The strict rules of evidence that are applicable in the courts are
not applicable in the administrative setting. It would be cumbersome
to compare all the evidentiary rules of the various central panel state
hearing agencies with those of the court systems in each state.
Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the hearsay rule because it is
applied so much more loosely in administrative hearings. Hearsay is
generally acceptable in administrative hearings, while it is still
generally excluded in the courtroom. The Federal Rules of Evidence are
now used as a model that most state courts follow in promulgating their
own rules of evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 802 (1997)
succinctly states the hearsay rule:
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress.
5 Municipality of Anchorage v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App. 1995).
5
"Deutchendorf and Leever v. Colorado, 920 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1996).
2Freeman v. State of Florida, 611 So.2d 1260 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1992)
5311 F.3d 1143 (3rd Cir. 1993).
"I I F.3d at 1145, quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 443.
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Rule 803 then goes on to list 24 exceptions to the general
hearsay rule that all law students must learn in their first or second year
of law school. These include the "present sense impression," "excited
utterance," "recorded recollection," "records of regularly conducted
activity," "reputation in the community" and "ancient documents"
exceptions, just to name a few. In short, the admissibility of hearsay
evidence in court is still very much restricted.
The contested case provisions of Maryland's Administrative
Procedure Act take a different approach to hearsay. Md. Code Ann.,
State Gov't § 10-213(b) and (c) (1995) state:
(b) The presiding officer may admit probative
evidence that reasonable and prudent individuals
commonly accept in the conduct of their affairs and give
probative effect to that evidence.
(c) Evidence may not be excluded solely on the
basis that it is hearsay."
As these subsections indicate, the hearsay rule is greatly relaxed
in the administrative setting. Nonetheless, any hearsay evidence
presented must still be credible. Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor
ofAssessments56 ; Kade v. Charles H. Hickey, Jr. School. 57 In Kade, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals overturned an action by the State
Department of Personnel to suspend a teacher at a school for juvenile
offenders for alleged misconduct. The disciplinary suspension was
based entirely on anonymous notes written by the appellant-teacher's
co-workers and students at the school, detailing his alleged misconduct.
The notes were undated; the circumstances of their authorship were also
unknown. In reversing the teacher's disciplinary suspension, the court
emphasized that hearsay, while admissible, must have some reliability.
"Language similar to that used in these subsections also appears in § 4-212(a) of
the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981, 1996-
97 Revised Edition).
s62 98 A.2d 148 (Md. 1973).
57566 A.2d 148 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
XVIII Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 86
The anonymous notes supposedly scrawled by co-workers and juvenile
offenders were so unreliable that they had no probative value and could
not serve as the basis by which to suspend a state worker from his
employment.
However, Kade also reinforced the notion that reliable hearsay
evidence is admissible in administrative hearings. "Indeed," the court
noted, "if hearsay is found to be credible and probative, it may be the
sole basis for a decision of an administrative body.""8
C. Flexible Due Process.
The adherence to concept of flexible due process in the
administrative setting is an important characteristic that distinguishes
administrative adjudicators from constitutional judges. United States
Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly originated this concept in his famous
article, "Some Kind of Hearing,"59 which only a year after its
publication, influenced the United States Supreme Court in writing its
decision in Matthews v. Eldridge.60
The term flexible due process, at first, may seem redundant.
The word "due" itself, after all, suggests that legal process can vary
from situation to situation. Yet, upon closer examination, the word
flexible is indeed necessary to emphasize the extraordinary ability of
the administrative hearing process to adapt to particular case types and
settings.
The methods for conducting administrative proceedings in
Maryland, for instance, are diverse. In child abuse and neglect
proceedings, administrative law judges hear oral argument from the
parties without taking evidence from the parties.6' The administrative
law judge's decision is based on his or her review of these arguments
in light of the record of abuse or neglect already compiled by the local
department of social services. However, the party accused of the
alleged abuse or neglect has the opportunity to submit written material
5 56 6 A.2d at 150, quoting Redding v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 282 A.2d 136
(Md. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972).
59123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1261 (1975)
6°424 U.S. 319 (1976).6
'Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 5-706.1 - 5-706.2 (Supp. 1997)
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up to 60 days in advance of the scheduled date of the oral argument to
refute information contained in the record. In Child Support
Administration cases (tax intercept and credit reporting), record reviews
without the presentation of testimony are permitted.62 Motor Vehicle
Administration hearings in Maryland are one-party hearings. The
appellant-driver presents his case before the administrative law judge.
The Motor Vehicle Administration is unrepresented.
By contrast, some hearings in Maryland can be complex.
Hearings for the Maryland Home Improvement Commission and
Maryland Real Estate Commission can involve four parties: the
Commission, a claimant who is making a claim against either the
Maryland Home Improvement or Real Estate Guaranty Fund based on
the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent and the Guaranty Fund.
I once conducted a hearing for the Maryland Real Estate Commission
involving six parties-three co-respondents (a broker, associate broker
and a sales agent), the Commission, the claimant, and the Guaranty
Fund.63 Pre-hearing conferences to sort out complex legal and scientific
issues are always necessary for hearings conducted for the Maryland
Department of the Environment, Department of Natural Resources and
Board of Physician Quality Assurance.
The sites used to hold administrative proceedings in Maryland
are also varied. They range from manager's offices at the local
departments of social services for public assistance hearings and mental
health facilities for involuntary admission hearings to true courtroom-
like settings that are used for more complex cases.
The wide variety in the methods for conducting hearings
illustrates how the flexible due process concept allows for adaption of
a set of procedures for each particular case type and, therefore,
promotes efficiency in the adjudicatory process. It would make little
sense to conduct Motor Vehicle Administration, Department of Natural
Resources and Real Estate Commission hearings in the same way. By
altering hearing procedures to fit the requirements of each case type,
parties and the government alike benefit from lower costs and
diminished need for legal counsel to be present when less-complex
62Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 10-113 (Supp. 1996) and COMAR 07.07.02.63Maryland Real Estate Commission v. Rosko; Claim of Ziolkowski, 88-RE-087
(1990).
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issues are involved. However, complex procedures can be put in place
for more complex hearings when such procedures and the participation
of legal counsel are needed to ensure fairness.
IV. Conclusion.
While recent trends suggest that the work of administrative law
judges and other administrative adjudicators is becoming more similar
to that of the constitutional judiciary, salient differences remain. These
differences exist because administrative adjudication has a different
purpose in our system of government. As appellate cases such as
Jones illustrate, there would be no need for executive branch
adjudication if it served the same purpose as adjudication in the courts.
Without relaxed rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule,
administrative proceedings would no longer be user-friendly; they
would assume all the trappings of full-blown trials in court. The
concept of flexible due process allows the administrative process to be
tailored to the subject matter of a particular case. Rigidly applied due
process, such as found in the courts, would stifle what has become a
fair and efficient means of providing administrative justice.
